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ABSTRACT
The UK’s referendum on EU membership that resulted in a narrow 
minority in favour of leave was followed by a leadership vacuum 
and intense debate about the implementation of the result. The 
politicization over Brexit resulted in the development of ‘Brexit 
identities’ of Remainers and Leavers that superseded party identi-
ties. We argue that in order to understand how this politicization 
took place despite a leadership vacuum we firstly need to look 
beyond the arena of formal party politics to more informal arenas 
of political contestation on social media, especially Facebook, and 
secondly understand the linkages between EU and national level 
politicization that polarised the country around new British-specific 
identities. Through this, we analyse the ‘politics of division’ not 
simply as a form of contentious politics driven by political parties, 
but as a social conflict driven by non-institutionalised groups, grass-
roots campaigns and ordinary citizens. We find evidence of signifi-
cant mobilisation that extends beyond the realm of party politics 
but argue that this mobilisation cannot necessarily be considered 
entirely ‘grassroots’. Rather, it is driven not just by citizens but also 
shaped by mainstream and alternative media platforms. The 
debates cannot, however, be considered purely a form of EU poli-
ticization, rather, analysis of Facebook comments shows that poli-
ticization over Brexit through these campaigns is primarily 
contestation over the nature and legitimacy of British democracy. 
Because of this, we argue that social media is an essential site for 
the study of EU politicization and political campaigns in general.
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Brexit as ‘politics of division’
The political battle over Brexit that continued after the June 2016 referendum intensified 
the fractures in British politics along ideological and increasingly along identitarian lines. 
The referendum resulted in an immediate leadership vaccum precipitated by most of the 
referendum’s key players stepping back. Both the Conservatives and Labour descended 
into crisis after Prime Minister David Cameron resigned and Labour leader Jeremy 
Corbyn’s leadership was challenged (Gamble, 2018, p. 1217). This leadership vaccuum 
was followed by constitutional gridlock and heated debates about democratic legitimacy 
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(Shaw, 2017) that resulted from the government’s lack of planning for the Leave 
eventuality and the incompatible promises made during the campaign. The ensuing 
polarisation saw the development of new ‘Brexit identities’ of ‘Remainers’ and ‘Leavers’ 
which divided not only the political party landscape but also became the most dominant 
cleavage in British society (Evans & Schaffner, 2019). This cleavage became the receptacle 
for broader political, cultural and identity-based divides that underpin what Wheatley 
(2019) describes as the ‘politics of division’, shaping not just partisan contestation over 
Europe but also division over British democracy itself. We argue that in order to under-
stand how this politicization took place we need to: 1) look beyond the arena of formal 
party politics to more informal arenas of political contestation, specifically, online move-
ments on social media, and 2) understand the linkages between EU and national level 
politicization that polarised the country around new British-specific yet at the same time 
EU-related identities. Through this, we analyse the politics of division not simply as 
a form of contentious politics driven by political parties, but as a social conflict driven by 
non-institutionalised groups, grassroots movements and ordinary citizens.
Firstly, we ask how and to what extent the ‘politics of division’ on social media reflects, 
in the absence of effective leadership, a form of ‘bottom-up’ politicization through 
(online) social movements beyond the sphere of formal party politics. The referendum 
campaign itself had demonstrated the importance of social media campaigning, revealing 
a high level of mobilisation on the Leave side (Heft et al., 2017). The Leave campaigns 
were subsequently implicated in one of the biggest cases of voter manipulation and 
disinformation, the Cambridge Analytica scandal (e.g., Cadwalladr, 2020). Yet, the 
period following the referendum saw significant and unprecedented pro-European 
mobilisation by Remainers (Brändle et al., 2018). Mobilisation through new Facebook 
pages representing ‘the 48%’ – the proportion of voters who opted to remain – and 
continued activity by existing campaigns resulted in more traditional social movement 
activity such as large-scale anti-Brexit marches, protests, and local pro-EU groups. This 
mobilisation, in turn, kept campaigning by Brexiters alive who sought to defend their 
vision of Brexit as the ‘will of the people’. These social media campaigns cannot simply be 
understood as the continuation of traditional partisan politics online nor are they solely 
driven by social movements through bottom-up mobilisation and innovative forms of 
collective and/or ‘connective action’ (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013). Instead, via social 
media, both Leave and Remain campaigns displayed a dynamic of their own that mixes 
centralised political organisation with spontaneous protest (see Milan, 2015). Yet, there is 
little systematic research that explores these polarizing dynamics of online politicization 
after the referendum that reaches beyond party politics and into the domain of social 
movement studies.
Secondly, we ask how and to what extent politicization over Brexit on social media 
shifted from contestation over Britain’s EU membership to a fundamental conflict over 
democratic legitimacy. While party contestation focused mainly on the form Brexit 
should take – mostly solidifying around the idea of a so-called ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ Brexit, 
social movements raised more serious questions about the British polity, not least, about 
the role of referendums in a system in which parliamentary sovereignty is the core 
constitutional principle. In this article, we explore these forms of bottom-up politiciza-
tion through social media campaigns’ use of Facebook platform affordances and con-
testation over Brexit in Facebook user comments. We provide evidence of significant 
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mobilisation that extends beyond the realm of party politics but argue that this mobilisa-
tion cannot necessarily be considered ‘grassroots’ in the tradition of (online) social 
movements. Instead, this mobilisation is driven in large part by mainstream and alter-
native media platforms. Furthermore, as our analysis of user comments indicates, the 
‘politics of division’ over Brexit relates not just to the question of EU membership, but is 
primarily contestation over the nature of British identity and legitimacy of British 
democracy.
Politicization beyond Euroscepticism
To understand how the Brexit referendum created a deeply divided UK we need to 
theorize EU contestation beyond the framework of Euroscepticism. In the existing 
literature on EU politicization, it is divisions over identity that are expected to create 
a constraining dissensus that fundamentally changes the rules of the political game 
(Hooghe & Marks, 2009). Understood as a ‘politics of identity’, EU politicization is not 
just limited to times of crisis but denotes an axial transformation of European integra-
tion. While we share some of these concerns, we also believe that the existing accounts of 
EU politicization have focused too narrowly on the ‘mainstreaming’ of Euroscepticism as 
a force that undermines EU legitimacy (Startin, 2015). We argue that EU politicization 
remains incomplete if the opposing side, that of pro-European mobilisation, is not 
considered. Euroscepticism not only needs an external target (which is the EU), it also 
needs a domestic opponent, which is found in political actors who run pro-EU cam-
paigns. Eurosceptic dominance as it happened before the referendum would be a case of 
incomplete politicization, while truly polarised debates with high levels of mobilisation 
by both opposing camps were only triggered afterwards. Following De Wilde and Trenz 
(2012), Euroscepticism can be understood as EU polity contestation in which Eurosceptic 
arguments about EU legitimacy are confronted in public discourse with their pro- 
European counterparts. Arguably, pro-Europeans before the referendum had an interest 
in de-politicising the EU in domestic politics (Fawcett et al., 2017). With the Brexit 
referendum, the dynamics of contestation changed as depoliticization for the losing side 
was no longer an option, requiring enhanced mobilisation by Remainers. We thus 
analyse politicization by looking at mobilisation and polarisation on both sides of the 
pro-/anti-EU divide.
However, we suggest that focusing solely on the pro-/anti-European divide misses an 
important dimension of EU politicization. Rather, the possible shift in polity contestation 
from the EU to the domestic level should also be considered. EU politicization has 
important repercussions on domestic politics (see e.g., Hoeglinger, 2016). EU debates 
contributed to delegitimizing democratic institutions and elites at the national level 
(Galpin & Trenz, 2019). Especially during Brexit, the effects of politicization cannot be 
properly understood if we do not take into account the way in which Eurosceptic 
mobilisation has fundamentally changed the rules of the democratic game domestically. 
Brexit campaigns only had a minor impact on EU technocratic governance, but a major 
impact on national-democratic government. It is not simply the legitimacy of the EU 
polity that is at stake, but the democratic constitution of the nation-state. EU politiciza-
tion is therefore not a zero-sum game that weakens EU legitimacy while strengthening 
the arena of re-nationalised politics. EU politicization instead can seriously undermine 
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the legitimacy of both EU and national politics. We would expect that this shift was 
promoted by pro-European mobilisation as a counter-movement to the dominance of 
populist mobilisation during the referendum debate (Roth, 2018). At the same time, this 
continuation of contentious politics at domestic level would imply even higher levels of 
polarisation leading to hostility and eliminating the in-between space where different 
alternatives could be developed. As we argue in the following, such polarisation effects 
are advanced by social media as an arena of contentious politics.
Social media as a site of politicization
Democratic deficits, a lack of political representation and low levels of trust in govern-
ment and established political parties are often accompanied by the formation of protest 
and social movements trying to gain visibility in the public sphere (see e.g., Della Porta, 
2020). This has been illustrated not just by progressive movements such as the Arab 
Spring, anti-austerity movements and Black Lives Matter, online far-right and white 
supremacist movements (Daniels, 2009) but also by Brexit. In the digital age, so-called 
online social movements have gained momentum, enabling broader mobilisation 
through less rigid forms of organisation and affiliation (McCaughey & Ayers, 2013). 
Digital activism results from, on the one hand, the efforts of existing social movements to 
use social media sites for the purposes of progressive, racist or anti-systemic protest (e.g., 
Della Porta, 2020; Dencik & Leistert, 2015). Improved communications and wider reach 
become, on the other hand, an opportunity to raise broader awareness of issues of shared 
concern and to assemble supporters of different backgrounds from the bottom up. These 
groups are loosely connected, but digital media technologies help make different levels of 
engagement possible, such as sharing opinions and engaging in forums, signing online 
petitions and participating in decision-making processes.
Social media, therefore, also results in the development of ‘digital opinion move-
ments’, understood as online social movements that comprise ‘spontaneous online 
mobilisations of the general/attentive public, which temporarily turns into an active 
public’ (Barisione & Ceron, 2017, p. 81). The leadership vacuum following the Brexit 
referendum arguably extended the arena of politicization by widening opportunities for 
these informal, spontaneous and grassroots online movements. Citizens can sponta-
neously express emotion, react and respond quickly to events, reach high numbers of 
people and convey messages quickly and cheaply. They can even organise protest 
activities such as marches and street actions, thus enabling the formation of more 
traditional offline social movements without limiting them to their respective political 
systems (e.g., Bennett & Segerberg, 2013). Looking at social media sites of EU politiciza-
tion is all the more relevant because social groups can connect different campaigns and 
networks on their ‘side’. Social media is therefore not simply a side-arena of partisan 
contestation, but, as in the case of post-referendum campaigns, is used to bypass partisan 
politics by facilitating the emergence of informal and bottom-up digital movements. 
While British mainstream parties wished to de-politicize the EU membership issue, social 
media campaigns allowed for continued or even intensified mobilization.
However, scholars are increasingly doubtful that social media is a passive platform 
empowering progressive social movements. The architecture of social media platforms 
promotes polarized communities. Digital movements of opinion are understood to be 
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cross-cutting and ad-hoc, distinguished from more organised, long-term social move-
ments that mobilise particular social interests or groups (Barisione & Ceron, 2017, p. 81). 
Facebook architecture is well suited to this development of polarized communities 
beyond formal party politics, creating so-called ‘filter bubbles’ in which users commu-
nicate in ideologically segregated communities (Flaxman et al., 2016). Platform features 
(or affordances) contribute to this polarisation by standardising how people can com-
municate with each other (e.g., through requiring specific ways of reacting to posts). 
Facebook’s features such as posting, buttons for liking and other emotional expressions, 
sharing, or commenting enable users to express political opinion and provide content 
that can be replicated and modified, searched, and subsequently be recorded or archived 
(Bond et al., 2012; Boyd, 2011, p. 46). Platform affordances are consequently not passive 
enablers of political mobilisation, rather ‘they significantly contribute to structure modes 
of interactions and relationships’ (Milan, 2015, p. 57). Via mediated, monitored and 
curated campaigns on social media, Facebook presented a practicable solution to assem-
ble like-minded Leavers and Remainers in separate groups, to share content from pro- or 
anti-EU media sources and construct narratives about Brexit.
Increasing criticism has also been levied at social media companies who have failed to 
prevent the spread of especially far-right disinformation. The Brexit referendum and the 
election of Donald Trump in November 2016 were supported by powerful campaigners 
making use of new digital technologies such as social media bots, mass data-harvesting 
and targeted ads (see e.g., Bastos & Mercea, 2019; BBC News, 2018; Boczkowski & 
Papacharissi, 2018). The hybridity of media platforms also enables the spread of not 
just mainstream legacy media content but also ‘alternative’ sources as a way of mobilising 
people and promoting ideas (Chadwick, 2013). ‘Dark money’ originating with US 
billionaires such as the Koch Brothers was found to lie behind the pro-Brexit alternative 
media platform spiked (Monbiot, 2018). Millionaire Leave.EU donor Arron Banks1 co- 
owns Westmonster, a UK-based news site modelled on Steve Bannon’s Breitbart which 
launched in 2017 (Rajan, 2017). Furthermore, the House of Commons Digital, Culture, 
Media and Sport Committee Report (House of Commons, 2019) found evidence of 
Russian interference in the referendum, with anti-EU stories by Kremlin-aligned media 
circulating online at the time. While acknowledging that the actual impact on voting 
choices is hard to measure, the report makes clear that social media platforms potentially 
allow democratic processes to be manipulated by powerful internal and external actors.
We argue that to understand Brexit in relation to a form of polity contestation not just 
over the EU but also over British sovereignty and democracy, we need to conduct more 
in-depth research into not only how official online campaigns and non-institutionalised 
actors and platforms used social media platforms to target individuals (such as, for 
example, Heft et al., 2017; Usherwood & Wright, 2017), but also how users engage in 
campaigning. Such a bottom-up perspective of social media politicization does not deny 
that division can also be steered by powerful interests. Social media campaigning sites 
are, however, also used for exchanging knowledge on a plurality of issues as well as for 
expressing opinion and emotions (see e.g., Fanoulis & Guerra, 2017). Through new 
information feeds and through emotions, the public sphere is kept in a state of alert, 
even if formal political action discontinues. In order to investigate EU politicization as 
a form of identity politics, we therefore need to understand community-building through 
exchange of information and opinion between campaigns and followers that contributes 
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to the construction of distinctive identities and closed online communities (see e.g., 
Brundidge & Rice, 2009). It is from this perspective that we can analyse how social media 
movements contribute to social divisions.
We therefore understand pro- and anti-Brexit campaigning sites as networked move-
ments of opinion which are formed in part through the design features that make 
Facebook a social network or platform provider. We analyse such features, comparing 
how anti- and pro-Brexit sites’ use them and how they influence the dynamics of such 
groups as they become networks for spreading information, sharing and constructing 
opinions and mobilising over a common cause or identity. Through such dynamics, pro- 
and anti-Brexit pages can create their own content, post and share content that supports 
their common goals or collective identity and express critique. In the following, we 
outline our method and case selection.
Methods and case selection
Our data collection proceeded in two stages. The first stage of our analysis 
involved identifying the Facebook campaigns active during the period prior to 
the trigger of Article 50. We compiled a list of public pro- and anti-Brexit 
Facebook pages active during the two weeks from 24th January to 
7 February 2017 marked by the Supreme Court’s judgment that Parliament must 
vote to empower the Prime Minister to trigger Article 50 and the subsequent 
passage of the bill through parliament culminating in the European Union 
(Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017. On these pages, we used a snowballing 
search technique through a variety of keywords such as ‘Brexit’, ‘Leave’, ‘Remain’, 
‘48ʹ, ‘Article 50ʹ, ‘EU citizens’, ‘EU’, ‘Britain’, ‘Europe’. By following links to 
‘suggested’ pages, we expanded this sample. Only those pages with a specific 
interest in the UK’s membership of the EU or the EU referendum were included. 
We excluded pages with less than 1,000 likes, pages that were not active at the 
time of data collection in 2017, and party websites – with the exception of ‘Labour 
Leave’ as the only remaining active page in favour of a so-called ‘Lexit’ (left-wing 
exit from the EU). After a comprehensive list of Facebook pages was compiled, we 
collected data on page activity. Through Facebook’s ‘engagement’ indicator, which 
combines numbers of page likes, reactions, comments and shares, we were able to 
identify the most active in a set of rough categories for anti-Brexit and pro-Brexit 
pages.
We sampled a mix of pre- and post-referendum pages, including pages of official or 
semi-official referendum campaigns as well as ostensibly ‘grassroots’ campaigns that have 
no obvious or formal link to official campaigns or parties. We also incorporated a mix of 
pages representing different ideological leanings and, for the anti-Brexit campaigns, what 
we refer to as ‘special interest’ pages (Table 1).
In the second stage of the data collection, we identified three key periods of two 
to three weeks during the first phase of ‘uncertainty’ for our data collection, 
outlined below in Figure 1: We collected page stats, posts and comments for all our 
selected pages (outlined below) during the key time periods. Looking at key time 
periods allows us to manage a large amount of data at moments that potentially trigger 
high degrees of user engagement and mobilisation. While this strategy does not allow 
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for identificationof more spontaneous activity, we are interested in how the hybrid 
media system facilitates both top-down and bottom-up mobilization. The data were 
collected in February 2017, which means that the engagement we captured was con-
temporary and not the result of interaction over time. We developed a codebook in 
SPSS to analyse both posts and comments on pro- and anti-Brexit Facebook pages 
which we supplemented with qualitative coding in NVivo. In summarising our quali-
tative findings we do not provide specific information on page and date for comments. 
Although the data is fully anonymised and Facebook comments are not indexed on 
Google, providing such specific data risks individual names of commenters being 
identified through active searches.
Table 1. Sample overview.








Anti-Brexit 862 107 316
48 and Beyond Unofficial, post-referendum 286 28 62
Keep Britain in the European 
Union
Unofficial, pre-referendum 135 20 74
Open Britain Previously official Stronger In 
campaign
36 4 20
Scientists for EU Special interest 103 13 50
Healthier in the EU Special interest 88 11 45
New Europeans Special interest 182 26 54
3million Special interest 32 5 11
Pro-Brexit 900 102 400
Leave.EU Pre-referendum UKIP-backed 
campaign
139 21 70
Get Britain Out Pre-referendum unofficial page 248 20 85
EU – I voted LEAVE Post-referendum unofficial 155 20 75
Anti-EU – Pro-British Pre-referendum unofficial page 230 27 125
Labour Leave Pre-referendum 128 14 45
Total 1762 209 716
Immediate post-referendum 
period
Jun 24 - Jul 13 Labour Party (Sep 24 - 28) and 
Conservative Party (Oct 2-5) 
conferences
Sep 23 - Oct 7
Supreme Court ruling and 
aftermath
Jan 24 - Feb 8
Theresa May becomes Prime 
Minister, Jul 13
Supreme Court rules against 
Government, Jan 24
Brexit Referendum, Jun 23
White Paper passage through 
House of Commons, Feb 8
Election of Corbyn as Labour 
leader, Sep 24
Announcement of ‘Great Repeal 
Bill’, Oct 2 Government publishes White 
Paper, Feb 2
01/06/2016 01/07/2016 31/07/2016 30/08/2016 29/09/2016 29/10/2016 28/11/2016 28/12/2016 27/01/2017 26/02/2017
Figure 1. Time periods for sampling. NB: The bars below the scale indicate the sampling period while 
the milestones above the scale highlight relevant political events in the referendum aftermath for 
orientation.
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Campaigning through Facebook
Platform affordances for bottom-up politicization
In order to answer our first research question on how bottom-up politicization reveals 
a ‘politics of division’ during Brexit, we investigate how Remain- and Leave-affiliated 
campaigns on Facebook used platform affordances to express their opposing views. We 
find that while there is indeed some evidence of citizen-driven mobilisation through 
Facebook campaign networks, these movements are not necessarily ‘grassroots’ or ad- 
hoc. Instead, campaigns and online movements are to a significant extent guided by 
mainstream and alternative media sources. The extensive sharing of newspaper articles 
and dominance of ‘guided opinion formation’ over contestation suggests that the cam-
paigns to some extent reproduce existing political and legacy media divides.
‘Liking’ and other reactions to posts, the abilities to share, create or modify content are 
all part of Facebook’s platform affordances which help Leavers and Remainers to set up 
their own, separated campaigns with opposing views and maintain politicization over 
Brexit from the ‘bottom up’. Figure 2 shows that pro-Brexit pages are generally more 
active in terms of engagement: the number of posts being shared (on other pages, private 
messages, or their own pages) by users following pro-Brexit campaigns exceeds the 
number shared via anti-Brexit pages, as is the case when it comes comments on these 
posts (the Leave.EU page reaches almost one million reactions in the three sampled time 
periods). This matches the pattern of the referendum where the social media landscape 
was dominated by the Leave campaigns (Heft et al., 2017). Yet, we also see a high level of 
engagement on the anti-Brexit side, particularly with posts from the Scientists for EU and 
Keep Britain in the EU pages, as well as the new 48 and Beyond page. The data shows that 
the post-referendum period involved continued politicization of EU membership 
0 100000 200000 300000 400000 500000 600000 700000 800000 900000
48 and beyond
Keep Britain in the EU
Open Britain
Scientists for the EU





















Number of shares Number of reactions Number of comments
Figure 2. Engagement with posts in full sample.
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through existing campaigns and the launching of new, post-referendum campaigns on 
both sides.
Politicization from the ‘bottom up’ also took place through grassroots content net-
works. This can be seen in the types of platforms from which campaigns take their 
content. We distinguish between institutional platforms (such as legacy media), alter-
native media outlets and blogs, and social media. Table 2 outlines the types of platforms 
used as sources from which the content was shared. This is crucial, given that mainstream 
media now also have social media pages which connect news platforms directly with 
social media users. (e.g., through Facebook pages of The Guardian). We find that the 
most common platforms campaigns connect to are other social media pages, mostly on 
Facebook. This shows that Facebook features facilitate a high level of cross-posting from 
other pages on the same platform. These features also help campaigns to create their own 
‘content universes’. Given this, we also explore types of content shared via social media. 
Table 3 shows the social media content produced by journalists, other campaigns, 
experts, parties, government and social media users. We find that just under a third (anti- 
Brexit) and a quarter (pro-Brexit) of shared social media content was created by the 
campaign itself or by other campaign groups on the same ‘side’. This finding demon-
strates that, through platform affordances, campaigns are highly connected amongst 
themselves which contributes to building distinct communities of Leave and Remain 
supporters beyond the specific page in question.
There are, however, key differences in the extent to which the campaigns promote 
bottom-up mobilisation. Pro-Brexit pages refer to user-generated content (also coded 
when content appeared amateur or when the content creator was not identifiable) almost 
twice as much as anti-Brexit pages (23.5% vs 14.0%) (Table 3). This confirms the 
tendencies of Brexit supporters to also focus their attention on more alternative sources 
Table 2. Platform types from which shared content originated.
Anti-Brexit Pro-Brexit Total
Institutional 38.3% 33.3% 35.9%
Alternative media & civil society 11.2% 23.5% 17.2%
Social media 44.9% 37.3% 41.1%
Other 2.8% 1.0% 1.9%
None 2.8% 4.9% 3.8%
Grand Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Table 3. Content producer based on social media platforms.
Anti-Brexit Pro-Brexit Total
Campaign (group-owned) 19.6% 15.7% 17.7%
Campaign (Pro-Brexit other) 0.0% 6.9% 3.3%
Campaign (Anti-Brexit other) 10.3% 0.0% 5.3%
User-generated content 14.0% 23.5% 18.7%
Experts 2.8% 0.0% 1.4%
Government 0.9% 1.0% 1.0%
Journalist 45.8% 44.1% 45.0%
Right-wing politicians/parties 0.0% 1.0% 0.5%
Left-wing politicians/parties 0.9% 0.0% 0.5%
Not specified/unclear 1.9% 2.9% 2.4%
None 3.7% 4.9% 4.3%
Grand Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
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of opinion-formation and on appearing as grassroots movements. Despite this, pro- 
Brexit campaigns are less likely than anti-Brexit campaigns to use their pages for 
traditional collective action. Over a quarter of posts on anti-Brexit pages include explicit 
calls to action, for example, asking followers to write to their MP, join a protest, sign 
a petition, or share content on social media, in contrast to just one in ten posts on pro- 
Brexit pages. This demonstrates that anti-Brexit pages, to some extent, use their plat-
forms for traditional grassroots social movement efforts alongside information-sharing 
and opinion formation. Such mobilisation efforts online likely entrenched polarisation 
over Brexit after the referendum, as its legitimacy was immediately contested on the 
Remain side. Pro-Brexit campaigns, however, drew on alternative media and linked 
extensively to other social media pages, but did not seek to transform this into genuine 
grassroots mobilisation in the same way.
Politicization of Brexit through the communities of Remainers and Leavers cannot, 
therefore, always be considered simply ‘bottom up’. We see that both sets of campaigns 
are not guided by formal party politics but by mainstream media and journalists. Table 2 
shows that around a third of the platforms linked to by both sets of campaigns is 
mainstream media (forming the majority of ‘institutional’ platform types). We can also 
see that, furthermore, just under half of social media content is some form of (traditional 
or non-traditional/mimicked) journalistic output (see Table 3). News media are thus an 
important driver of mobilisation through these more informal Facebook pages after the 
Brexit referendum. This high level of mainstream and journalistic content indicates the 
hybrid character of news media, as professional journalists and news outlets have moved 
towards building audience loyalty via social media, establishing their Facebook presence 
(Chadwick, 2013, p. 47). In so doing, they allow users to engage with their content via the 
platform features of sharing, posting, liking and others.
We also observe the role of mainstream media in shaping distinct ‘content universes’ 
(Figure 3). The division between traditionally right-wing and pro-Brexit and left/liberal 
and pro-Remain news outlets is clearly demarcated. While anti-Brexit pages rely mostly on 
the left-learning pro-Remain The Guardian (39.5%) or BBC News (20.9%) (which is 
expected to remain politically neutral but is highly contested on both sides for being 
‘biased’ to the other side), pro-Brexit pages share content from the pro-Leave Daily Express 
(28.9%) or The Telegraph (26.3%). We further find that pro-Brexit campaigns generally 
share more tabloid news than anti-Brexit campaigns. This difference is important given 
that British tabloids strongly favoured Leave, with the exception of The Mirror (Deacon 
et al., 2016). Furthermore, as Chadwick et al. (2018) show, the sharing of tabloid news on 
social media predicts democratically dysfunctional behaviour related to dis-/misinforma-
tion. The mainstream journalistic output shared via anti-Brexit and pro-Brexit Facebook 
pages thus to a large extent reproduces broader dividing lines within the wider media 
landscape and exposes followers to news opinion broadly in line with their existing 
positions.
Yet, we also find that pro-Brexit pages tend to favour connecting with alternative 
media platforms (23.5%) when compared with anti-Brexit pages (11.2%) (see Table 
3). We see here that pro-Brexit campaigns link to ‘alternative’ or alt-right websites 
and blogs such as, for example, Arron Banks’ Westmonster, brexitcentral.com and 
now defunct websites such as brexitbible.co.uk and yourbrexit.co.uk. With their 
dubious or opaque funding sources, the latter sites might be considered ‘Astroturf’, 
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or fake grassroots organisations, that have wealthy funders and mimic journalistic or 
grassroots output (Bennett & Livingston, 2018, p. 129). Pro-Leave Facebook pages 
may also be investigated as ‘Astroturf’ organisations, for example, Get Britain Out – 
one of the most active pro-Brexit pages we identified – is run by bookseller Julian 
Blackwell, who, according to a Channel 4 News report (Channel 4 News, 2013), gave 
UKIP its second largest individual donation since 2001, and Jayne Adye, who writes 
for Breitbart and the Daily Express. Such campaigns therefore lack authenticity 
through masquerading as bottom-up movements and hiding their elite support 
(Walker, 2014, p. 33). Anti-Brexit pages, when they do use alternative media, link 
to civil society platforms such as the New Europeans and Europa United. These 
differences between anti- and pro- Brexit pages seem to reflect the distrust of Leave 
supporters especially in institutional sources and the success of pro-Brexit platforms 
with opaque funding sources, backers and agendas in gaining social media traction. 
As such, the politics of division on social media is not only grassroots but can also be 
steered by powerful interests through not just mainstream media but also fake 
grassroots campaigns that receive funding by alt-right groups and companies.
EU or domestic polity contestation? Analysing posts and user comments
For our second research question regarding whether the campaigns are engaged in 
politicizing the EU or the national polity, we analyse issues raised by users in both 
camps and how they justify their opinions relating to EU and British democracy. We 
show how, while users do debate EU polity issues, they also contest the legitimacy of the 












Figure 3. Legacy media content shared on anti- and pro-Brexit pages.
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Both campaigns dedicate about half of their posts to Brexit issues specifically such as 
arguments for or against Brexit, the trigger of Article 50, or Brexit’s impact on Britain. 
Anti-Brexit pages demonstrate greater mobilisation by raising campaign issues. Thus, as 
the campaign came to an end for the Leave side, a new campaign began for the Remain 
side. This is mirrored in the attention paid by pro-Brexit pages to general party politics 
(including questions about political parties and candidates in the UK, EU or interna-
tionally), as Brexit becomes a tangible reality and needs to be dealt with in UK, EU and 
international politics, particularly in the relationship to the US. Both campaigns also 
raised issues concerning immigration, social welfare, or foreign policy, which were 
however not always directly related to Brexit.
We further distinguish between three modes of justification for why particular issues 
raised in the main posts were relevant: problem-solving (utilitarian/efficiency), collective 
self-understanding (values-based), and justice/fairness (rights-based). Justifications were 
coded with regard to these three different understandings of Brexit as affecting our 
interests (utilitarian), our rights in relation to universal principles and/or fundamental 
norms or fairness, or our shared values and identity. For instance, posts that called for 
a stop to Brexit because of the expected negative impact on the UK economy were coded 
with a utilitarian justification, but posts that called for Brexit to be implemented in order 
to defend British national identity or the ‘will of the British people’ would be coded with 
a values-based justification, because it relates to justifications in relation to a bounded 
community. Posts addressing Brexit as a question of democratic legitimacy but did not 













Utilitarian Rights Values Utilitarian Rights Values
stnemmoCstsoP
Anti-Brexit Pro-Brexit Total
Figure 4. Justifications across sites in posts and comments.
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Figure 4 shows a large congruence in the use of justifications with campaigners on 
both sides focusing mainly on rights-based justifications. This emphasis on rights is even 
more pronounced amongst users in comments than in the main posts on Facebook, 
which indicates a process of bottom-up mobilisation of concerns with democracy. 
Nevertheless, 52.2% of the 209 posts and 54.7% of the 716 comments coded do not 
contain a justification as to whether rights, utilitarian or identity-related aspects underpin 
the message. The absence of justifications in around half of the posts and comments 
indicates a rather moderate level of persuasive, argumentative messages in the posts, 
mirrored by reactions in comments.
In order to understand the extent to which politicization refers to the EU and/or the 
domestic polity, we sub-sampled and analysed comments which specifically addressed 
the issue of the political and procedural aftermath of Brexit. Doing so resulted in 261 
comments, 104 comments in anti-Brexit campaign sites and 157 pro-Brexit campaign 
sites. We paid particular attention to the themes that underlie their justifications. Table 4 
provides an overview of the qualitative analysis of comments.
In both camps we find a strong tendency to engage with questions related to the 
domestic economy and British democracy. Indeed, the EU is not the main reference 
point. On anti-Brexit sites, commenters often use utilitarian justifications, balancing 
economic cost-benefit relations. Opponents of Brexit are generally concerned about the 
consequences of Brexit for the UK’s economy, and implications for themselves and 
others in the labour market across different sectors (e.g., ‘It is the hardest thing to 
understand why areas benefiting the most or with high profile success stories voted 
brexit. Wales when you read this. Sunderland with nissan. any clues’). Anti-Brexit 
commenters also express stronger concerns about the UK’s political standing and its 
diplomatic and trade relations with other countries, mostly the US and the rest of the EU. 
Anti-Brexit commenters do not consider Brexit an appropriate solution for existing 
problems in the UK (e.g., ‘You can’t blame all of the woes of the NHS on Brexit! The 
NHS has been underfunded since God knows when!’). Many comments also deal with 
issues of efficiency and functionality, for example, seeing Brexit as a pointless exercise or 
believing there is no deal that could be better than the current arrangements. There is also 
a view that Brexiters believe in ‘some magical utopian world . . . with prancing unicorns 
and fairies’ rather than sound economic analysis.
Table 4. Justifications in comments with issue ‘Brexit’ (multiple coding possible).
Anti-Brexit comments Pro-Brexit comments Total
Rights
Civic-individual 1.05% 1.58% 1.4%
Moral 22.11% 34.21% 30.18%
Political-democratic 15.79% 21.05% 19.3%
Social 2.11% 0% 0.7%
Utilitarian
Economic, cost-benefit calculation 16.84% 6.32% 9.82%
Efficiency, functionality 15.79% 22.63% 20.35%
Political calculation 11.58% 4.21% 6.67%
Values
Desires 3.16% 1.58% 2.11%
Identitarian 6.32% 4.74% 5.26%
Practices 5.26% 3.68% 4.21%
Grand total 100% 100% 100%
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Regarding rights-based justifications, anti-Brexit commenters consider the referen-
dum result to be based on too narrow a majority or to be non-binding, as one commenter 
maintains, ‘referendums are never a “final” result because they are only advisory, albeit 
they can influence parliament towards a decision if they are overwhelmingly leaning 
towards one side’. In addition, this majority is considered to be the product of an either 
disinterested and/or uninformed majority of voters or of explicit disinformation invol-
ving ‘deliberate lies’ from fearmongering Leave politicians and Brexit campaigners, 
described by one commenter as a ‘miscarriage of justice’. Another describes UKIP’s 
campaign as ‘waged with hatred at it’s [sic] heart’. Others also speak disparagingly of 
Brexit voters, for example, ‘May knows only the thickos voted for Brexit and those stupid 
idiots will believe any old rubbish, so she’s saying “Brexit means Brexit” and doing 
nothing’. Finally, they also criticise politicians in the post-referendum period for failing 
to properly represent the ‘48%’, perceived to be ‘working on behalf of only the 52% rather 
than the interests of the whole country’. They are highly critical of MPs – especially 
Labour ones – preparing to trigger Article 50, for example, ‘Tories are used to being 
turncoats but Labour MPs should be thoroughly ashamed of themselves’. In combination 
with arguments concerning political-democratic issues, comments in anti-Brexit groups 
tend to focus less on popular sovereignty, but rather on how to remedy the perceived 
illegitimate referendum result. As such, it transforms into contestation over British 
democracy and into values-based justifications that make claims on behalf of ‘48%’ or 
‘remainers’ as a new political identity.
Many pro-Brexit comments related to efficiency and functionality arguments often 
in relation to an understanding of the referendum as legitimate. They considered the 
political negotiations after the referendum as too long and complicated, asking to get 
Brexit done, e.g., ‘And what is our government actually doing? Sitting on their hands 
hoping we will change our minds because everything the remoaners said is an absolute 
lie . . . ’ This is interesting against the background of Johnson’s 2019 electoral success 
with almost this exact slogan (‘Get Brexit done!’). Furthermore, pro-Brexit commen-
ters express the need to leave as soon as possible on the grounds that the EU is 
a failing organisation, for example, ‘I dont think Europe needs to catch up . . . It needs 
to stop floundering and drowning itself’, suggesting some element of EU polity 
contestation.
Generally, pro-Brexit comments understand the referendum as a legitimate and final 
decision and that democratic debate is illegitimate at this point after the referendum. The 
possibility of not implementing the result is expected to mean that, all of a sudden, 
democratic principles ‘do not count’. Commenters support a model of direct democracy, 
for example, ‘The highest court in the land has got it wrong we the people are sovereign 
body. Parliament and the members are there to do the will of the people’. Commenters 
often consider politicians as untrustworthy and corrupt when they speak out against 
Brexit or mention difficult negotiations, e.g.,
The UNELECTED House delaying the WILL of the people? Dare they? If they do, then even 
bigger change is coming and they WILL be swept away by it.
A delay to Brexit is considered a betrayal of the pure will of the people, ‘The Snake MAY 
is planning to betray us all!!’, with Remainers referred to as, for example, ‘seditious 
traitors who should be stripped of public office’, ‘treasonous scum’, or ‘dangerous 
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fascists’. Black Labour MP Diane Abbott, who abstained in the vote, furthermore appears 
in abusive or dehumanizing racist comments. Pro-Brexit commenters, far more than 
Remainers, also express a lack of trust in media organisations such as the BBC, which 
they consider to have a Remain bias, ‘the BBC this morning with yet another panel loaded 
with Remainers banging on about a second referendum, it’s time they were given a hefty 
kick up the backside’.
Some EU politicization is present through pro-Brexit comments relating to values and 
identity associated with Britishness or Englishness in which they claim exclusive national 
identities that exclude the European or supranational level in their defence of national 
sovereignty for example, ‘Lets get back to English politics and rule first.get rid of all the 
remain campaigners. HAPPY INDEPENDANCE DAY PEOPLE [sic]’. A defence of the 
nation often invokes Donald Trump’s infamous slogan ‘make America great again’, for 
example, ‘People made there [sic] choice accept it and let’s make BRITAIN -GREAT 
BRITAIN AGAIN. After all the EU is on its knees anyway’. Such justifications sometimes 
present a militaristic interpretation of Brexit, linking back to the war and a historical 
defence of the nation, for example,
If we wanted to be ruled by Europe our elder generation would have just gave hitler our 
country without a fight. Our elder generation fought for our freedom what would they think If 
the idiot left wing remainers won? It would have been disastrous for us Brits.
Such a defence of Britishness often also involves defending the nation from immigrants 
(and by extension the EU) using racist language, for example, speaking of the current 
state of Britain as including
run down NHS, dirty streets, litter strewn verges, street lights off, ideal for muggers, burglars, 
and murderers, which we now have plenty of disguised as so called refugees, a country now 
with thousands upon thousands of legal and illegal economic immigrants, every one 
a potential terrorist, a race of people invited into our country by our traitorous leader, and 
forced on us by the EU.
Our findings show that the EU is rather marginal in these debates on both sides. We find 
evidence for strong polarisation and contestation over Brexit as a national-democratic 
rather than EU issue, paired with political frustration, yet for opposing reasons. Our 
qualitative analysis also points to a fundamental disagreement about how the decision to 
withdraw from the EU should be understood. Anti-Brexit commenters consider this 
decision to have been reached through undemocratic means and electoral manipulation. 
Pro-Brexit commenters, however, are concerned with the long negotiations, which they 
tend to consider as sign of political corruption, as an intentional delay to Brexit by 
government and opposition representatives.
Conclusion
Our analysis found evidence of a social movement-driven ‘politics of division’ over Brexit 
beyond party politics in the immediate aftermath of the referendum. These movements 
utilised new forms of social media campaigning and – in the case of anti-Brexit cam-
paigns – incorporated calls for traditional collective action. Important drivers of these 
movements were, however, not always ‘grassroots’ but mainstream and alternative media 
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platforms, in some pro-Brexit cases backed by entrepreneurs from the wealthy anti- 
establishment.
Through the concept of ‘platform affordances’, we describe such new forms of online 
mobilisation and the creation of grassroots and informal pro- and anti-Brexit commu-
nities. This mobilisation has resulted in the development of movement identities for the 
two opposing camps through campaign names (for example, those referencing the 48%), 
connecting with other like-minded online communities through shared content, as well 
as low-key political engagement through ‘liking’ and ‘reacting’. The transition from 
online activism and ‘connective action’ to more traditional collective action, such as 
street protests or writing petitions to MPs, is also present primarily amongst Remainers. 
Further research is needed to consider the ways in which mobilization on social media 
connects with this more traditional civic engagement and mobilisation. Nevertheless, we 
expect that the large-scale anti-Brexit demonstrations witnessed since the referendum 
were primarily organised bottom-up via many of the social media pages we have analysed 
(see also Brändle et al., 2018).
The finding that EU-related campaigns transform into nationally focused collective 
action highlights a further contribution to the literature on EU politicization. The idea 
that EU issues transform into national ones through politicization can go some way to 
explain Dolezal et al’s finding that mass-level EU politicization remains limited without 
increasing over time (Dolezal et al., 2016). Through a social movement and social media 
perspective, we show how post-referendum mobilisation involves redirecting the cam-
paigning target. Facebook pages are used by both sides to spark debate not necessarily 
about the EU, but rather about the future of British democracy. While anti-Brexit 
commenters consider the referendum illegitimate, pro-Brexit commenters understand 
complicated negotiations as a delaying tactic by political elites. This demonstrates the 
way in which Brexit divisions are predicated not solely on EU membership, but on 
a wider conflict over democratic representation. The main concern that drives post- 
Brexit politicization is therefore the deprivation/assertion of rights and the future of 
democracy, which shows how debates are turned inwards and not solely about the UK’s 
external relations in Europe. Against these findings, our research contributes to the 
understanding of the dynamics of social media mobilisation during heightened EU 
politicization in important ways. We observe that the political division over Brexit across 
ideological camps has transformed into a social and identitarian struggle across society.
For social movement studies, it is also important to emphasize that a neat distinction 
between bottom-up and top-down mobilisation cannot always be made. Content shared 
on Facebook pages takes a hybrid form, partly created by grassroots campaigners and 
partly by legacy and alternative media platforms. Furthermore, suspected ‘Astroturf’ 
content appears on ostensibly ‘unaffiliated’ social media campaign pages with little 
transparency regarding support and funding. Pro-Brexit campaigns and websites sus-
pected of being financed by wealthy donors and potentially dark money ‘borrow the 
repertoire of grassroots mobilisation’ (Walker, 2014, p. 9). The post-referendum political 
vacuum might thus be filled by powerful influencers outside the sphere of formal party 
politics. Recent elections have been influenced by dubious financing structures, dark 
money, astroturfing and ‘bot armies’, thus putting grassroot movements at risk and 
threatening the further marginalisation of grassroots voices. The implications of ‘astro-
turf mobilisation’ on social movements, democratic politics, and civic participation need 
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to be further investigated. We thus call for research into the way in which top-down 
interests meet with mass participation on social media, potentially in collaboration with 
computer scientists, security studies or investigative journalists, in order to explore the 
origins particularly of far-right or ‘alt-right’ social media campaigns. Nevertheless, 
through the case of Brexit, we have highlighted the importance of considering the hybrid 
media landscape and elite influence when exploring political mobilisation on social 
media.
Note
1. Questions have been raised about the origins of Banks’ wealth (Ramsay, 2018), although the 
National Crime Agency found ‘no evidence’ of electoral crimes commited by Leave.EU and 
Banks during the referendum.
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